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IMACHI NKWU: TRADE AND THE COMMONS
ABSTRACT. The conventional view is that an increase in the value of a natural resource can lead to
private property over it. Many Igbo groups in Nigeria, however, curtailed private rights over palm
trees in response to the palm produce trade of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I use the
Ostrom (2007, 2009) framework for analyzing social-ecological systems to guide the construction
of a model of this transition. An increase in the resource price leads the owner to prefer communal
harvesting, which simplifies monitoring against theft. I support this framework with evidence from
colonial court records.
“Palm cutting always cause palaver.”
Obuba of Ububa, Nkwo Udara Civil Suit 111/37
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I use the Ostrom (2007, 2009) framework for analyzing social-ecological systems
to explain the adoption of communal palm harvesting (imachi nkwu) in response to commercial-
ization of palm oil among the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria. I use this framework to identify the
characteristics of the resource system, resource units, the governance system and users that explain
this transition. Under communal harvesting, the majority of palm trees would be set aside for the
use of the entire community, regardless of who owned the land under them. Harvesting was only
permitted on specific days, during which each member of the community could harvest as much as
he wished. Communal harvesting simplified the act of detecting theft, lowering its marginal cost.
Monitoring under private property was largely undertaken by the property owner or his relatives,
was non-cooperative, and required proving that a thief had attempted to steal oil from the owner’s
trees. Under communal property, thieves needed only to be caught taking more than their share
by harvesting on the wrong day. Any member of the community could catch a thief. Though
property owners surrendered a share of the harvest under common property, rising palm oil prices
increased the incentive to steal, accentuating the benefits of this arrangement. Communal harvest-
ing gave potential thieves incentives to monitor. Anything stolen was now also taken away from
their share of the harvest. The value of this loss rose with the price of oil. Because theft often
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occurred before palm fruits were fully ripe, the costs of early harvesting were now borne in part
by potential thieves. These incentives increased aggregate monitoring under communal property,
reducing returns to effort in theft and the responsiveness of this effort to the price of oil.
I construct a simple model in which the key result is that, if the price of palm oil rises above a
certain threshold, communal property will improve the welfare of property owners while making
potential thieves no worse off. I validate this account using information recorded in colonial Native
Court transcripts. I use these materials in two ways. First, these provide historical evidence on how
property rights worked, how they changed, and how they were negotiated. Second, these records
serve as evidence that the mechanisms highlighted by the model were those that drove the transition
from private to communal harvesting.
Disputes over palm harvesting reflected a split between property-owning elders and thieving
youths who wished to steal oil in order to pay for bride price, taxation, schooling, and other ex-
penses that required cash. This is evident from both the language and facts of the cases. In addition
to the economic value of palm oil, the cases show that controlling access to palm produce was a
source of political authority. Communal harvesting was a means for elders to retain symbolic con-
trol while making economic concessions. The cases reveal that the defense of property rights was
costly, and was complicated by the need to prove both points of fact and points of law. While it
was also costly to prevent violation of communal harvesting arrangements, the types of effort that
went into monitoring under both arrangements show that it was easier to defend against thieves
under communal harvesting. Communal harvesting was a scheme to reduce effort costs, though
the specific rules used to implement it varied considerably across communities.
I test the framework in two ways. First, I extend the model to include colonial taxes, and argue
that youths’ needs to collect oil for tax payment made it rational for elders to surrender some of
their rights. This too is evident in the court records. The need to pay tax encouraged greater
theft by youths, and spurred the creation of communal harvesting arrangements. The conflict that
occurred over this transition drew in colonial officials, who struggled to simultaneously maintain
the prestige and authority of the elders on whom they depended to implement colonial rule, while
averting social conflict and collecting tax revenue. Second, I use characteristics of the resource
system, resource units, the governance system and users to account for differences between Igbo
systems of property rights over palm trees and those practiced by the Yoruba and Urhobo.
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This study relevant to three broader questions. First, why does common property exist? The
literature stresses benefits of the commons, including scale economies, risk pooling, and equity,
and the difficulties of dividing it. Second, what facilitates collective action? The literature sug-
gests several conditions for regulation of the commons, including group cohesiveness, feasibility,
information, and resource value. Third, how does trade affect the commons? Conventional wis-
dom originating with Demsetz (1967) argues that that trade encourages externality-reducing shifts
from common to private property. Though the literature has moved on from this, is has not, to my
knowledge, considered that price increases could lead to a transition from private property to com-
mon property. For the Igbo, equity, political considerations, and, most significantly, the costs of
maintaining private property relative to those of monitoring collective harvesting drove the adop-
tion of communal harvesting. The Igbo implemented collective palm-cutting in relatively small,
homogenous communities, using already-existing institutions of local governance. Trade did not
erode the commons.
2. FRAMEWORK
2.1. General framework. Ostrom (2007, 2009) provides a general framework for the analysis of
social-ecological systems (SESs). An SES consists of four first-level subsystems, each of which is
made of multiple second-level variables:
(1) The Resource System. Second-level variables include: sector, clarity of boundaries, size,
human-constructed facilities, productivity, equilibrium properties, predictability, storage
characteristics, and location.
(2) Resource Units. Second-level variables include: mobility, growth or replacement rate,
interaction among units, value, size, distinctive markings, and spatial and temporal distri-
bution.
(3) The Governance System. Second-level variables include: Government and non-government
organizations, network structure, property-rights systems, operational rules, collective-
choice rules, constitutional rules, and monitoring and sanctioning processes.
(4) Users. Second-level variables include: number, socioeconomic attributes, history, location,
leadership/entrepreneurship, norms/social capital, knowledge of SES and mental models,
dependence on resource, and technology.
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This framework helps identify variables relevant for studying any specific SES. For example,
Ostrom (2009) applies it to the question of when communities will avert a “tragedy of the com-
mons.” She identifies characteristics of the resource system (size, productivity, and predictability),
of resource units (mobility), of the governance system (collective-choice rules) and of users (num-
ber, leadership, norms and social capital, knowledge, and importance) as predictors, based on case
study evidence. I am concerned with common pool resources, defined by their high subtractability
of use and the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries (Ostrom, 2010). Understanding how
property rights will respond to trade requires applying the framework to three questions:
2.1.1. Why does common property exist? Private property over resources increases investment
incentives, makes collateral available, eases exchange, and generates information (Libecap, 2007).
Why does the commons persist, despite its apparent inefficiencies?
Characteristics of the resource system and resource units shape likely outcomes. First, these can
create particular benefits to common property. Scale economies can make common property at-
tractive, as in the case of Alpine pastures (Netting, 1976). Similarly, a semicommons allows users
to operate on multiple scales; the English open fields, for example, combined larger-scale com-
mon grazing with smaller-scale individual grain production (Smith, 2000). Common property or
scattering within a semicommons can allow risk pooling (McCloskey, 1976). Resources requiring
large collective infrastructure, such water in an irrigation system, are unlikely to be divided (Ba-
land and Platteau, 2003). Where output is a public good, common property can enhance efficiency
by reducing free riding (Besley and Ghatak, 2009).
Second, the benefits of securing exclusive access to a resource depend on its characteristics.
Resources for which conservation and improvement require investment and maintenance are more
likely to be privatized (Baland and Platteau, 2003). Coastal salmon harvesters in the Pacific North-
west gained more accurate information about the effects of harvesting on salmon stocks if rival
users could be excluded. Upstream harvesters could not gain a similar advantage, and were more
likely to tolerate trespass (Johnsen et al., 2009).
Third, the costs of surveying, defining, registering, marking, and defending rights will all de-
pend on resource characteristics. Where resources are mobile or difficult to observe, property
rights are more likely to be assigned to output flows rather than resource stocks (Libecap, 2007).
For example, the negative externalities of oil extraction at multiple points from the same reservoir
create pressures for solutions such as unitization, prorationing, and lease consolidation (Libecap
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and Wiggins, 1984). However, the transactions costs required to achieve these outcomes are in-
creased if, for example, both oil and gas exist within the same reservoir, or price fluctuations make
information about resource value costly (Libecap and Smith, 2002). Diffuse ownership of small
plots of land in France weakened support for consolidation and enclosure (Grantham, 1980).
Characteristics of the governance system also influence outcomes. States may intervene where
definition of rights becomes too complex for users, where a need is perceived to mobilize resources
for growth, or where state support of a particular property rights regime will benefit a politically
powerful constituency (Libecap, 1986). Assuming that the state responds to users’ demands for
reform, however, ignores heterogeneous social structure and culture, and presumes the state is
responsive to users’ demands (Platteau, 1996). It is unrealistic to assume that formalization efforts
will simply recognize existing claims. Women, in particular, are likely to lose rights, while elites
typically manipulate registration processes in their favor (Platteau, 1996). Allocation of rights
generates both wealth and political influence, making it contentious (Libecap, 2007).
Specification, monitoring and enforcement of rights are separate functions, and states will not
necessarily provide these. Political disorder can leave the state too weak to determine property
rights (Grantham, 1980). What Libecap (2007) calls “political transactions costs” also create path
dependency, as they make initial allocations of property rights difficult to change later. Budgetary
pressures and staffing levels may lead governments to under-provide definition and enforcement of
property rights (Alston et al., 1996).
All defense of property requires effort by the possessor. On frontiers, such as California during
the Gold Rush and the Amazon more recently, communities of users have initially defined de facto
property rights and helped each other to enforce their claims. (Alston et al., 1999; Umbeck, 1977).
In these situations, it is more likely that de jure rights enforced by the state will differ from de facto
rights defined by possessors. This can lead to conflict when competing claimants have differing
capacities for violence (Alston et al., 2012). In the history of US land policies, allocations based on
prior use, adapted to local conditions, and free of government mandates were generally the most
effective in avoiding resource degradation (Libecap, 2007).
Political economy and legal considerations frequently lead to inefficient outcomes (Libecap,
1986). In US fisheries, for example, governments have been emphasized the rights of all citizens
to access, and have been unwilling to support voluntary agreements that could be considered an-
titrust violations, or to assign rights over large areas (Johnson and Libecap, 1982). Inefficiently
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small producers have received the support of the state both on the US great plains, and in the oil
sector (Hansen and Libecap, 2004; Libecap and Smith, 2002). Prorationing has become more com-
mon than unitization or lease consolidation in the US oil sector, since it satisfies the participation
constraints of small producers, not because it is efficient (Libecap and Wiggins, 1984).
Characteristics of users also matter. Demands for equity are particularly powerful, and help
explain support for common property (Baland and Platteau, 1998). Subjective views matter; for
example, individuals may sabotage land sales to outsiders after privatization (Platteau, 1996). On
the Northwest Coast, reciprocal gifts insured First Nations groups against environmental shocks,
strengthening their incentives to invest in building their salmon stocks. These gifts also provided
possible rivals with a reason not to intrude on a group’s fishing stocks, lessening the potential for
conflict and violence (Johnsen et al., 2009). Monitoring common property may be cheaper, since
users can work together to monitor each other and exclude outsiders (Runge, 1986).
If there are limited returns to investment or few new technologies available, the benefits of
division may be low (Platteau, 1996). Fixed investments made under an existing property rights
arrangement raise the transactions costs of altering the regime (Libecap, 2007). Resources such as
land often have non-economic value to users that inhibits privatization: in Africa, land is important
for reasons of ancestry, emotion, group membership, social insurance, and its safety relative to
financial assets (Platteau, 1996).
2.1.2. What facilitates collective action? The capacity for collective action shapes the costs of
supporting a common property regime. Characteristics of the resource system and of resource
units influence its feasibility. Commons are governed more effectively when monitoring of re-
sources and use is low-cost and verifiable, and when resources, population, technology, and so-
cioeconomic conditions change slowly (Dietz et al., 2003). Feasibility demands that inexpensive
means of conflict resolution and clear boundaries exist, so that intruders and violators are read-
ily detectable and easily punished (Ostrom, 1991). Information is needed about the limits of the
resource; because this is costly, resource dilemmas are rarely resolved before the problem has
become severe (Libecap and Smith, 2002). Specific features such as scattering can mitigate strate-
gic behavior (Smith, 2000). Resource value can make regulation worthwhile (Libecap and Smith,
2002).
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The governance system also shapes collective action. States undermine local regulation of the
commons by withholding services, by imposing top-down management, and by facilitating intru-
sion of outside interests (Baland and Platteau, 2003). Rules must receive the support of users, and
violations of social rules must be well-defined (Dietz et al., 2003). For example, authorities that
supported herd reductions on the Navajo Reservation lost legitimacy, and grazing restrictions have
been politically unpopular (Libecap and Johnson, 1980). Political economy concerns will also
weigh on local governance structures; controls exercised within the commons will be subject to
distributional pressures (Libecap, 1986).
Users’ characteristics also matter. Johnson and Libecap (1982) highlight the importance of high
contracting costs among heterogeneous users with difficult-to-observe effort in preventing informal
agreements. Dietz et al. (2003) emphasize the need for frequent communication, social capital, and
inexpensive exclusion of outsiders. In laboratory settings, communication may be more effective
than punishment (Janssen et al., 2010). Levels of trust and cooperation are influenced by con-
textual and microsituational variables (Poteete et al., 2010). For example, individuals may learn
to cooperate over time if their group contains a critical number of conditional cooperators (Vol-
lan and Ostrom, 2010). Group cohesiveness provides past experiences of cooperation, existing
arrangements, punishment systems, networks of mutual obligation, shared norms of reciprocity,
trust, clear and stable group membership, and low rates of exit (Ostrom, 1991).
2.1.3. How does trade affect the commons? Several writers have adopted variants of the Demsetz
(1967) approach, suggesting that resource value drives privatization. Umbeck (1977) argues that,
if the gains outweigh the costs, individuals will make contracts with each other to divide property
and will respect each others’ rights, even in the absence of a state. This is more likely as the value
of the resource rises. For Alston et al. (1996), demand for the security and collateral that come
with title increase with proximity to markets that raise the productive potential of land.
Many communities, ranging from irrigation users in the Philippines to herders in Switzerland,
have been able to successfully regulate existing common property resources for commercial use
(Ostrom, 1991). Baland and Platteau (1998) note that Demsetz-type views are subject to selection
bias; we observe not how institutions change, but which changes survive. These predictions ignore
possibilities such as degeneration into open-access. Further, it is possible that the state simply
expropriates the resource. Besley and Ghatak (2009) note that this has been common historically,
and is less likely where the state has a monopoly on coercive authority, where coercion is costly,
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where states can commit, build reputations, or have long time horizons, where resource prices are
low, and where the quality of institutions is high.
Theories of how the commons may respond to trade base their predictions on characteristics of
the resource system, resource units, the governance system and users. Taylor and Brander (1997),
in discussing the possible immiserizing effects of trade, consider the depletion of a renewable re-
source under open-access, non-cooperative harvesting. Depletion of biomass in Ghana in response
to trade liberalization follows a similar logic (Lopez, 1997). Hotte et al. (2000), when considering
the effect of trade on property rights enforcement, consider the nature of poaching, enforcement,
resource depletion, and alternative sources of employment. Copeland and Taylor (2009) specify
a model in which, at low prices, open access should prevail. With price increases, however, pri-
vate property, limited management, or the continuation of open access can occur. Critically, the
response to trade depends on state capacity, on resource growth, and on technology.
2.2. Question. This paper asks why the Igbo adopted communal palm harvesting in response to
the commercialization of palm produce. Answering this question within the Ostrom (2007, 2009)
framework requires identifying the relevant characteristics of the resource system, resource units,
the governance system and users.
2.2.1. Users. The Igbo are Nigeria’s third-largest ethnic group. During the colonial period, they
lived mostly in communities of a few hundred to over two thousand persons (Gailey, 1970, p. 23).
The small size and homogeneity of these communities facilitated collective action. The Igbo used
palm oil in cooking prior to commercialization (Martin, 1988, p. 32). Palm products were the
most important Igbo exports during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Lynn, 1997, p. 34).
The purchasing power of palm oil rose continuously over the nineteenth century (Allen, 2011).
Assessment Reports for the Aba and Bende Divisions estimated that palm produce contributed
between 1% and 51% of household income, averaging 20%.1 In the Aba Native Court Area (NCA),
for example, palm nuts were cut every 24 days. On each occasion a man would cut approximately
5 heads of fruit. Over a year, this would be enough to produce 3 tins of oil, worth 18s, and 400 lbs
of kernels, worth £2/4/0 (Abadist 9/1/1362).
2.2.2. The resource system and resource units. Palm trees were rarely planted on purpose. One
official estimated in 1907 that there were 6 palms per acre in the vicinity of Aba (Martin, 1988,
1Abadist files 8/11/2, 14/1/1077, 8/11/12, 9/1/1362, and 9/1/1362.
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p. 46). This scattering blurred boundaries and made monitoring more difficult. Palm fruits could
be harvested year-round. While reaping palm fruit did not cause permanent damage to the trees,
the village stock of palms was like a fishery insofar as the gathering fruits before they were ripe
would would reduce total yield. Once palm oil became an important source of cash with which to
pay colonial taxation, early harvesting by some individuals could leave others without the means
to pay tax when it came due.
2.2.3. The governance system. Authority was decentralized in Igbo society, with power divided
between the amala (village council), the Ezeala (Earth priest), umokpara (the ofo-holders, or com-
pound heads), the okonko secret society, and the age grades (Oriji, 1991, p. 31-42). These already-
existing institutions of local governance facilitated enforcement of communal harvesting, though
the diffuseness of authority could create problems of overlapping jurisdiction. Until 1929, British
rule was carried out in Igboland using a system of “warrant chiefs,” who sat as members of local
Native Courts. In 1928, annual poll taxes on adult males ranging from 4 shillings (s) to 7s were
introduced. Late in 1929, the “Women Riot” against taxation, the warrant chiefs, the native courts
and the depressed state of trade prompted reforms (Martin, 1988, p. 106). Native Courts were cre-
ated, comprised in each village-group of a “massed bench of elders,” while Native Authorities were
established that included the eldest man of each ezi (compound) and any young men they chose
to co-opt (Martin, 1988, p. 121). Records from these reformed Native Courts are the principal
sources for this study.
Colonial and anthropological evidence suggests that many Igbo areas of southeastern Nigeria
responded to the export trade in palm produce during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by
limiting their recognition of the exclusive rights held by certain individuals and lineages over
palm trees. In their place, Igbo groups such as the Ngwa enacted the practice of imachi nkwu,
or communal palm-cutting.2 Allen noted it in his Intelligence Report on the Ngwa (SP021 CSE
1/85/3708), as well as his unpublished “Ngwa Customs,” which is quoted at length by Chubb
(1961, p. 48-49):
As soon as the commercial value of palm-oil and kernels was appreciated by the
people, new regulations were formulated by the village councils to control the tak-
ing of produce from communal trees. Gradually these regulations were tightened
up until at the present time strict laws exist governing the ownership of all palm
2The term itself comes from Chuku (2005, p. 51).
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trees in a community. The majority of palm trees in a village are now reserved for
the community, no matter whether they are of natural growth or have been planted
by an individual... In order that each member of the community shall receive an
equal benefit, and to prevent deterioration of the trees through continual cutting, a
certain day is set apart generally once in 20 days, when every member of the com-
munity may cut as much produce as he desires. On this day a drum (Nkwa Nkwu)
is beaten... This drum is in the care of an elder of the village, who is specially
selected for this duty by the village council. Until this drum has been beaten any
member of the community who takes produce from communal palm trees is guilty
of an offence for which he may be fined one goat, or the equivalent of £1 by the
village council. Since the introduction of general tax this system has been extended
to include trees which in ordinary circumstances are privately owned. At the com-
mencement of tax collection an order is promulgated by the village council to the
effect that for a specific period, generally three months, the ownership of all private
palm trees will be vested in the community.
Similar institutions were employed by the Aro, in Umuahia, and in other densely populated
areas of Owerri Province (Chubb (1961, p. 49), Chuku (2005, p. 51)).
Allen explains imachi nkwu as a result of the palm oil trade and the “communal spirit” of the
Igbo. Green (1941) adds taxes to this explanation. She conducted fieldwork during 1935 and 1937
at Umueke Agbaja, in Okigwi. While she found little land was left under group control, rights
over palms were in a state of ambiguity, fluctuating between “restriction of rights to those who
owned the land on which the palms stood and the extension of rights to anyone to cut anywhere”
(Green, 1941, p. 17). She was told that, in the past, people had restricted cutting palm nuts to
trees on their own land, but during a period when the population dwindled, it had been decided
that individuals could harvest anywhere within Umueke (Green, 1941, p. 18). After the population
recovered, cutting was once more limited to land of one’s own lineage. The eldest man in the
village had been instrumental in passing the restriction. He had many trees on his land, and lacked
the vigor to compete with youth in harvesting (Green, 1941, p. 17). She was told that the rule had
been passed because “the strongest people cut to the detriment of the less strong,” and because of
the introduction of the head tax. Some landowners who could not climb found others harvesting
from trees on their land, but found these others unwilling to help them pay their own tax. By
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1937, the youth of the village had successfully challenged the rule, forcing the elders to accept
an “intermediate” position between the two extremes of communal and private rights over palms
(Green, 1941, p. 19).
Together, these characteristics of the governance system suggest that considerations of equity,
politics, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing property rights help explain communal harvest-
ing of palm oil.
3. MODEL
3.1. Setup. There are two players – one elder E and one youth Y . The elder possesses a grove of
trees that yield one unit of oil, which can be sold for a price of p. At the beginning of the game, the
elder chooses between private property and communal property. If the elder chooses communal
property, he also chooses what share θ of the oil he will offer the youth before the game begins.
This is done subject to the constraint that he leaves the youth as well off under communal property
as under private property. The purpose of this model is to demonstrate that, under reasonable
conditions that fit those of the case under study, an increase in the price of palm oil can lead the
elder to prefer communal property to private property, leaving the youth no worse off.
Under either property regime, the game has one stage. The elder chooses a level of costly mon-
itoring, defending his grove against theft. This can be thought to encompass both pure monitoring
and enforcement. Simultaneously, the youth chooses how much effort to expend in stealing. Under
private property, the youth directs his efforts towards the entire grove. Under communal property,
he only attempts to steal from the fraction 1 − θ of the oil that he would not otherwise receive as
his communal share.
3.2. Private property. Under private property, the elder chooses his level of monitoring m > 0.
This costs him dm, where d > 0 is the elder’s marginal cost of monitoring effort. The youth exerts
effort s > 0 in stealing. The youth faces a cost of stealing cs, and so c > 0 is his marginal cost of
effort. The oil is shared according to the amount of effort expended. That is, the youth receives a
share s
m+s
, while the elder receives a share m
m+s
. If neither party exerts effort (i.e. m = s = 0),
then the elder receives the full unit of oil.
The elder and youth’s problems can be written as:
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(1) V PE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
p− dm
}
, and V PY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
These are concave, and so they can be maximized from their first-order conditions. The elder
and youth’s best responses, then, are:
(2) mPBR = max
{√
sp
d
− s, 0
}
, and sPBR = max
{√
mp
c
−m, 0
}
.
Together, these give equilibrium levels of monitoring and theft:
(3) mP∗ =
(
c
c+ d
)2
p
c
, and sP∗ =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p
d
.
Substituting these equilibria into (1) gives the equilibrium payoffs under private property:
(4) V PE =
(
c
c+ d
)2
p, and V PY =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p.
3.3. Communal harvesting. Under communal property, the elder begins by offering a share θ
of the oil to the youth. He is willing to do this because the costs of monitoring under communal
property are lower, for reasons outlined above. In particular, his marginal cost of monitoring is
now γ, where d > γ > 0. It is assumed he can commit to θ. Communal property, however, also
entails a fixed administrative cost of k¯. This captures the cost of organizing and overseeing the
harvest according to a set schedule of days.
Thus, taking θ as given, the elder and youth’s problem scan be written as:
(5) V CE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯
}
, and V CY = max
s
{
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs
}
.
Again, these are concave, and can be solved from their first order conditions. The elder and
youth’s best responses, then, are:
(6) mCBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
γ
− s, 0
}
, and sCBR = max
{√
m(1− θ)p
c
−m, 0
}
.
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Conditional on θ, these can be used to give equilibrium levels of monitoring and theft:
(7) mC∗ =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p
c
, and sC∗ =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p
γ
.
Substituting these into (5) gives the equilibrium payoffs under communal property, conditional
on θ:
(8) V CE =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p− k¯, and V CY = θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)p.
Given these conditional payoffs, the elder will choose the minimum θ that satisfies the youth’s
participation constraint that V CY ≥ V PY . In particular, he will choose:
(9) θC∗ =
(
d
c+d
)2 − ( γ
c+γ
)2
1−
(
γ
c+γ
)2 .
Substituting θC∗ into (8) gives equilibrium payoffs under communal property:
(10) V CE =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
c+ 2d
c+ 2γ
)
p− k¯, and V CY =
(
d
c+ d
)2
p.
3.4. Commercialization. The elder will prefer communal property when V CE ≥ V PE . From (4)
and (10), this is equivalent to stating that he will prefer communal property when:
(11) p ≥
(
c+ d
c
)2(
c+ 2γ
2(d− γ)
)
k¯.
That (11) is a positive cutoff for p follows directly from the assumption that d > γ. This is the
main result of the model: a rise in the price of palm oil can induce the elder to switch to communal
property in order to reduce monitoring costs, leaving the youth no worse off. If the elder is unable
to choose θ, then a similar cutoff rule applies only if θ is sufficiently small (see Appendix B.1).
3.5. Other responses. Communal harvesting need not be the only option elders had available to
cope with the rising costs of monitoring under private property. Why did they not respond by
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cooperating in their defense of private property, manipulating the village council in order to more
cheaply protect their rights, or simply pay the youth to harvest for them?
Cooperative monitoring by the elders would be one possible alternative to communal harvesting.
I extend the model to include this possibility in Appendix B.2. There are two points to consider.
First, cooperative monitoring would have entailed a greater collective action problem than under
communal harvesting. When monitoring is a public good, it will be under-provided. Whereas
youths would have a direct interest in protecting their communal share from theft, other property
owners had no direct interest in each other’s property. The extension in Appendix B.2 shows that
this effort would only be provided if it were individually rational for each elder. An additional
difficulty is that private monitoring might create negative externalities, as youth divert their efforts
at theft towards less-secure plots. This would force all elders to monitor more intensively than if
these spill-overs did not exist.
Second, there is no reason to treat cooperative monitoring as an alternative to communal har-
vesting; cooperative monitoring could equally be used to defend private and communal tenure. The
extension in Appendix B.2 allows for this. With cooperative monitoring possible under both pri-
vate and communal property, the switch to communal property is again occasioned by an increase
in the price.
Judicial manipulation would have been self defeating. The village council was used to settle
many disputes aside from palm harvesting. Traditionally, the village council gave orders for clean-
ing paths, regulated prices, and dealt with both economic and “minor judicial” matters, including
issues arising within a single family or age grade (SP 021 CSE 1/85/3708). Damaging its credibil-
ity in this case would have made it less useful in other instances, especially as the village council
did not have a monopoly over dispute resolution. Further, if the standard of proof were lowered
artificially, punishments meted out by the village council would have become more arbitrary, and
would not have been effective deterrents.
Wage labor was problematic for several reasons. I model one of these in Appendix B.2 – any
worker employed to harvest oil for the elder would need to be monitored, in order to prevent him
from keeping any oil for himself. Where the technology of theft and monitoring by a hired youth is
the same as in the case with private property, I show in Appendix B.2 that the elder can indeed do
no better paying a wage than he can by defending his own property. Similar difficulties would face
an elder who attempted to hire a youth to monitor for him. In addition, the wage paid to the youth
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would have to be made sufficiently high in order to elicit monitoring effort. I show in Appendix
B.2 that the youth’s monitoring costs would need to be low relative to the elder’s costs for this to
be profitable for the elder.
There are additional difficulties with wage labor not captured by this extension. Elders may have
feared that giving up symbolic control of the harvest would have led to them losing control of their
palms altogether. I give examples below where control of palms was politically valuable. Further,
the timing of this payment presented a problem. Either elders would have to pay youth out of cash
reserves prior to the harvest, or payment in cash afterwards would create the possibility of a hold
up problem.
Further, wage labor was rare in Igbo society in before the Second World War. What wage labor
did exist by the end of the colonial period was largely migrant and seasonal (Uchendu, 1965,
p. 32). Martin (1988, p. 87-88) notes that, during the early twentieth century, “[m]arriage rather
than contractual wage relationships continued to be the mainstay of labor recruitment.” Hired
labor was a minor component of the labor supply in pre-colonial Igboland. Slaves, age mates, and
clientelist relationships remained important means of labor recruitment through the first half of the
century (Brown, 2003, p. 38).
3.6. Other considerations. The model above abstracts away from altruism, observability, credi-
bility of punishment, and Igbo seniority structures.
Adding altruism has the power to change the results. I extend the model to include this in
Appendix B.3. If both the elder and youth take each other’s material payoffs into account, it
improves outcomes for both players, since monitoring and stealing are both reduced. If altruism
is symmetric, this does not affect the material division of the oil, but does reduce the costs of
both monitoring and theft. This improvement occurs under both private and communal property.
Now that the youth cares about the fixed costs of common property k¯, the elder’s offer of θ is
conditional on the price of oil. This, along with the addition of the youth’s material payoffs to the
elder’s objective function, implies that the elder’s preference for communal over private property
is no longer necessarily equivalent to a price cutoff.
Adding reciprocity, would strengthen the case for common property. In public goods games, al-
truistic types will generally punish free riders, encouraging greater contributions (Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000). Reciprocity would have two effects. First, while I have not modeled monitoring by the
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youth under common property, reciprocity would sustain greater aggregate monitoring than self-
interest alone. This would reduce the returns to effort in theft, reinforcing the tendency for common
property to become more attractive as the price rises. In addition, a youth motivated by reciprocity
will view a relatively high offer of θ as “kind,” and reciprocate by lowering his effort in theft. This
will make common property more rewarding to the elder, as it would partially offset the cost of an
increase in θ, a benefit that would also rise with the price.
Adding observability would add little to the model. The sharing rule s
s+m
could be interpreted
as the probability that the youth steals successfully. The model excludes punishment. The evi-
dence below, however, makes it clear that thieves were sometimes taken before the village council.
If punishment is costly, repeated interaction is needed to make it credible. Credibility would be
greater under common property, because the greater number of potential witnesses and lower bur-
den of proof reduced the costs of proving a case (see below). In addition, in experimental public
goods games that resemble the common property scenario, individuals will punish bad behavior,
even if it is costly, provides them no material benefits, and is not observed (Masclet et al., 2003).
Finally, the seniority structure of Igbo society has complex effects. I extend the model to include
seniority in Appendix B.3, using a repeated game. The possibility of becoming an elder and acquir-
ing trees of his own can be used to secure the youth’s respect for private property. If the youth is
sufficiently patient, and the share θ offered to him under common property is small, then increases
in θ can be used to encourage his adherence to common property, even if he cannot be made to
respect private property. If θ is sufficiently large, however, this has the perverse effect of making
the position of an elder less enviable, weakening the usefulness of the possibility of promotion as
a tool to secure the youth’s cooperation. Colonial rule disrupted the Igbo seniority structure, gave
youth outside options beyond their communities and changed the rules of the political hierarchy,
weakening youths’ incentives to observe community rules. This helps explain examples in the
court records where common property arrangements had collapsed, and where elders’ authority is
questioned.
4. EVIDENCE
In this section, I present archival evidence on Igbo palm harvesting. I use this for two purposes.
First, these sources contain descriptive material not found in other accounts. They provide detail on
the administration, defense, and evolution of property rights in a very poor country. Second, these
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can be used to show that the mechanisms stressed in the model were those that drove the evolution
of property rights. I note that conflicts over palm harvesting in Igbo society largely pit elders
against youths as interest groups, that defense of property rights was costly, particularly when
palms were private, and that “communal” harvesting was used to restrict the effort costs associated
with harvesting and monitoring. The primary sources I use are from the National Archives of
Nigeria at Enugu. These consist mostly of Native Court records, and are described in Appendix A.
4.1. Intergenerational conflict.
4.1.1. Evidence. As in the model, the key participants in palm harvesting disputes were elders who
exercised control of palm groves. This split can be found both in the language of the court cases and
in the substantive facts behind them. Elders tell the court that laws are passed “for the young ones
to stop cutting the palm nuts” (NU 195/37), claim damages for “cutting the elders’ palm nuts”
(OGC 405/35), and sue as the defendants’ “father” (UNC 62/35) or as “the elder” (NU 55/25).
Defendants might similarly use terms such as “father” to refer to their accusers (UNC 115/35).
The facts of these cases show a similar division. A typical civil suit over palm harvesting in the
court records involves an elder, either alone or on behalf of the amala (village council), bringing
action against a youth or group of youths either for trespass on a private okpulor (private grove) or
for violating the village’s rules concerning communal palm-cutting. Youth would coordinate their
efforts in theft, in order to mis-inform the amala (village council) (UNC 115/35).
4.1.2. Stakes. The model emphasizes the distinction between elders and youths on the basis of
their differing endowments of resources. Evidence already cited above shows that palm oil was
of prime economic importance to the Igbo, and could contribute a meaningful portion of a man’s
yearly income. In addition, elders and youth differed in their demands for cash. Green (1941,
p. 18) reported that the young men of Umueke, in their dealings with the elders, had outlined these
pressures:
if the [elders] had refused to concede what they wanted they would have seized their
cows and sheep and sold them, since they must live somehow. As [her informant]
said, it is all very well for the old men, they have all got wives, but the young ones
have still to get together bride price to marry theirs and they need palm oil to sell
(Green, 1941, p. 18).
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These generational conflicts were not only economic. They were also contests over political
power. Whether palm trees were harvested communally or privately, control over them was a tool
with which to wield political authority. Leeming reported that a common privilege of office for
headmen and ezealas (Earth priests) in the Aba NCA was that certain days would be set aside for
townsmen to cut and collect palm kernel heads while clearing the brush for the headman’s farm
(Abadist 9/1/1362). Oriji (2007) argues that these privileges were a consequence of the taboos
needed to maintain the sacredness of authority in Igbo society. Since the ezealas (earth priests)
and okparas (elders) were not permitted to engage in mundane economic activities, they were
dependent on tribute. Elders in the court records make similar claims. One argued that all family
land, jujus (magical objects), and palm nuts had been vested in him (NU 313/38). Another claimed
monopoly over all palm groves as the eldest man (OVW 11/37).
Control of palms could be used as leverage. In one case, the elders found themselves unable to
evict a man from their village for incest and adultery; instead they fined him £1 and denied him
the right to cut palm fruits until this was repaid (NU 115/35). As political authority was diffused
outside the amala (village council), other interests also exercised social control through regulation
of palm cutting. In some villages, the okonko (secret society) had days specifically reserved for its
members to harvest. In one suit, the defendant claimed that he had left the okonko (secret society)
after converting to Christianity and had since been denied any rights over communal palms (NU
118/35).
The political value of this control helps explain why the elders attempted to settle disputes before
the amala (village council) before taking cases to the Native Court. For example, in NU 55/25,
the case was only brought to court after the defendant had been summoned to the amala (village
council) by his father, but had refused to come. In another case, the plaintiff told the court that if
the defendant had come to “beg” the amala (village council), no action would have been taken in
court (NU 55/35). Often, at least one defendant had already settled in the amala (village council)
before the case reached court, weakening the position of the other defendants who refused to do so
(ANO 244/41, UNC 132/38, OVO 148/36). Those who refused to settle outside of court could be
given additional fines for their recalcitrance (OVO 148/36).
By keeping control of the communal harvest, elders held on to symbolic authority. One witness
informed the court that the elders of his community inspected the villagers before cutting began
(NU 256/35). Similarly, violations of harvesting rules were interpreted as signs of disrespect. One
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plaintiff, accused of having cut fruit on a day reserved for elders, was described by the plaintiff
as a youth who “respects no elder” (NU 140/35). In his own defense, the defendant claimed that
he had paid the dues necessary to become an elder, but had not been permitted to join the amala
(village council).
4.2. The costs of defending property. The court records provide evidence of the costs of main-
taining private rights over trees. In addition to the direct effort in monitoring, property owners
had to prove points of fact and points of law in an environment where this was difficult. Although
communal harvesting also required administration and monitoring, evidence from the court cases
shows that this was simpler than what was needed under private property.
4.2.1. Private property. Landowners often had to depend on their own kin to detect violators.
One of the plaintiff’s witnesses told the court that it was his children who had caught the defendant
(Abadist 9/1/794: Mbutu Umu Ujima Group Court Civil Suit 142/35). In the sample of court cases,
there is no evidence of cooperative defense of private property.
Even when a thief was caught infringing on rights of private property, enforcing judgment was
costly, as it was difficult to prove facts. Factual disputes most commonly centered around the
boundaries on which the trees stood (e.g. MGC 222/36). Proving facts before the amala (village
council) and in the Native Court required either witnesses or oathing. A party who failed to bring
supporting witnesses could lose on this ground alone (ONC 713/21). A witness might not be
enough; in one case, the reviewing officer only accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s witness
because one of the defendants had contradicted his own story (MGC 256/35). Physical evidence
was of no use; the plaintiff of one dispute brought to court one bunch of nuts he alleged had been
cut by the defendant, but it would have been impossible from these to tell who had harvested them
and from what tree (UNC 199/38). Inspection of the land by the court was possible, but also costly
and potentially indeterminate.
Even with witnesses, oaths were frequently used to prove facts. In one case, the plaintiff was
given judgment in the native court when he offered to swear on a Bible, but the defendants refused
to provide one. The case was later reopened, and an inspection revealed that the defendants had
in fact harvested from their own trees, and that the plaintiff had been motivated by malice (NU
217/38). Fear of supernatural punishment was not sufficient to induce truth-telling. The plaintiff
of one suit accused the defendant and his people from going to the maker of the juju they had
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sworn on, paying him to remove its power (Abadist 9/1/26: Omuma Civil Suit 25/29). Other
litigants feared that their opponents, given the opportunity to swear falsely, would do so (Abadist
14/1/504: Arungwa and Amavor Group Court Suit 81/35).
Points of law were equally pernicious for landowners attempting to defend their rights. The
claim that palms were harvested communally was a common defence (e.g. NU 154/35). Some
of these assertions were outright lies. A plaintiff might try to cover his theft from a private grove
by telling the court that his community’s palm trees were communal (OVO 318/36). In some
instances, however, the customary law was actually unclear. The young defendant in one case
asked the court to decide whether he had the right to trees that had been planted by his father
on land that had been pledged to his father. The court had to adjourn to consult elders on this
point (NU 610/37). Further, the procedure for redress was complicated by the diffusion of political
authority, as disputes could be alternately settled before the amala (village council), by the okonko
(secret society), inside the ezi (compound), within the age-grade, or with the help of the oke amadi,
the wealthy members of the community who Allen labeled “the true de facto rulers of the village”
(SP 021 CSE 1/85/3708).
The Native Courts added an extra layer to this complexity and made their own procedural de-
mands. Plaintiffs who had taken a criminal action might be told to start afresh with a civil suit
(UNC 150/35). Political concerns also interfered with the working of the Native Courts. In one
dispute, the District Officer ordered that the proceedings from an earlier and related case be read
to the court. The plaintiff, writing for an appeal, complained that this had not been done, because
the court clerk would have been afraid to read this judgment in front of the sitting chiefs (Abadist
9/1/26: Umuma Native Court Civil Suit 35/29).
4.2.2. Common property. This is not to imply that regulation of effort when palm trees were har-
vested communally was costless. Some of the same difficulties in proving facts and negotiating
the Native Court system would have applied to communal harvesting. One of the greatest sources
of difficulty was ambiguity in the law. In some cases, one side will claim that common harvesting
was practiced, while the other party will deny it (e.g. OVW 35/37). A court unable to discern
which claim was true might resort to the swearing of juju (NU 42/35).
It is impossible to state how common these uncertainties were. While anthropologists and offi-
cials will understate their frequency in order to explain an ideal type, court records will overstate
them, since mis-understandings were a cause of disputes. Where they existed, these ambiguities
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might be the product of a longer history of negotiation about property rights. In one example, the
palms under dispute were owned in common by four towns, while both privately and commonly
owned trees coexisted. Twelve years before, the plaintiffs’ elders had made regulations concerning
the use of these trees. They had killed a goat to mark the occasion, but the meat had been refused
by the defendants’ elders, who did not inform their youth of what had occurred. The youth, then,
had no means of knowing what the rules were (UNC 49/35).
Collective action is made easier when the users of a natural resource are similar to each other.
In cases where several quarters attempted to enact communal harvesting together or where other
social conflicts intervened, co-operation would at times break down. For example, the community
of Umueteghbe decided after repeated offenses against the communal harvesting regulations to
no longer cut together, each onumara (quarter) keeping instead to its own land (NU 243/35). In
another case, the amala (village council) had decided that each compound should cut separately
after a violent dispute between the members of different compounds. Another witness in the same
case, however, noted that regulations were still enacted to restrict harvesting during the time when
tax payments came due (NU 192/27).
4.2.3. Relative costs. Where the rules were clear, monitoring under common property need only
detect that a violation had occurred, not on whose land, and could be effected by any member of
the village. Whereas defense of private property was a largely private act, maintaining the rules of
communal harvesting was in the interest of the whole community. This is the critical distinction
between the costs of monitoring under private and communal property in the model; while under
private property the costs of monitoring rise with the price of oil, they do not rise as quickly under
communal harvesting. The costs of maintaining private property could, as in the model above, be
such that a regulated communal harvesting arrangement was preferred. The participants in one
dispute explicitly told the court that they had united together in palm cutting because harvesting
had led them to go to court too often (NU 111/37).
The mechanics of communal harvesting provided other advantages that simplified monitoring.
The witnesses in one case indicated that they gathered together before harvesting; this would make
supervision easier (NU 256/35). The rigid schedule of communal harvesting also eased monitoring.
One violator had been caught when a villager noticed that a tree had been cut before the wooden
bell had been rung. Cutting was halted until the perpetrator was found (Abadist 13/8/50: Aba
Native Court Civil Suit 10/24). In another case, the amala (village council) had found the party
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guilty of violating the communal harvesting rules by making everyone swear juju and prosecuting
the man who refused (OVO 148/36). There were also positive spillovers across communities; the
witnesses in one case knew to lie in wait to see if the neighboring community were tresspassing
on their land when their neigbors rung a bell to signal that communal cutting had begun (Abadist
9/1/268: Umuaro Native Court Civil Suit 283/33).3
4.3. Communal harvesting: variations on effort restriction. Communal harvesting was, above
all, a means to restrict effort expended in harvesting palm oil. Those communities that practiced
imachi nkwu attempted to maintain strict controls over when and how their members could cut.
Where there were restrictions, specific days were set aside at regular intervals during which indi-
viduals could cut palm fruits at will. The beginning of the communal harvest was signalled by the
beating of a drum, and cutting when it had not been rung was punishable by a fine.
Within these broad outlines, regulations differed by village. Leeming wrote in 1927 of the Asa
NCA that:
The nuts are collected upon different principles in different villages of this area. In
some there is a day definitely fixed upon which the village will collect communally
and competitively. In other villages no such rules exist and people may collect
where and when they will. In some cases the fruit of the trees in the immediate
vicinity of the village is reserved for the older people (Abadist 14/1/1077).
In some villages, the men had been divided into two groups, each with separate turns (NU
284/37). Some villages ceased completely to recognize private rights over trees while others did
not. The defendant in one suit listed for the court some individuals who had once held private
rights to Okpulor [private] palm trees before the community had decided to deprive them of these
(MGC 161/36). Consistent with the interpretation that these restrictions were imposed to reduce
the negative externalities of harvest effort, some villages permitted cutting to be suspended if a
resident were under arrest or away at court (ANO 281/38).
Whether individuals could hire helpers or sell their own turns varied. Mayne noted that among
the northern Ohuhu of the Umuahia NCA, those individuals who could hire the greatest number
of laborers from neighboring towns collected the most fruit (Abadist 8/11/12). In the village of
3This case is included in the Web Appendix.
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Umuoke-nnunu, people were permitted to sell their turns, as was revealed when one of the de-
fendants of one case was charged with selling his turn to each of the three other defendants at
once (ANO 308/42). The defendant in another suit claimed that hiring of up to three reapers was
permitted at Umuejea. Although the plaintiff disputed this assertion, he took action against the
defendant, and not against the man to whom the defendant had sold his turn, and who had sold his
harvest to the plaintiff’s wife (NU 82/35). At Ndiegora, a stranger living in the town was brought
to court because, on the orders of his host, he joined the community in harvesting, despite having
been warned to go to his own town for this (ANO 109/41). Similarly, at Umumkpakara Mkpuru
it was said that a person who hired an additional person was made to pay a fine. The defendant
in a case from this village claimed that he had hired a man to cut nuts for his brother who was
away at school, but the plaintiffs protested that he should have called a boy to cut, as an adult
should not called to cut in place of a young boy (ANO 167/43). Together, these examples show
the varied strategies communities used to limit harvesting effort while maintaining an appearance
of legitimacy and equity.
5. TESTS
I provide two tests of my explanation of communal palm harvesting. First, I add direct taxes
to the model and show that the predictions fit evidence from the court records. Second, I use the
Ostrom (2007, 2009) framework to explain why Yoruba and Urhobo practices were different.
5.1. Direct taxation. Green (1941) suggests that direct taxation under colonial rule intensified the
conflict between elders and youth over palm harvesting, leading to communal harvesting in places
where it had not already existed. Taxes also help explain why communal harvesting persisted,
despite low interwar prices of palm oil. Suppose now that the youth must pay a tax of τ from the
sale of palm oil, so that he faces the constraint s
m+s
p > τ . If this is binding, it implies that his
optimal effort does not yield enough oil to pay the tax, and so he will invest only enough effort to
just meet this constraint, i.e.:
(12) sTAX =
τm
p− τ .
This will be the case when sTAX > sPBR, or:
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(13)
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This will occur if the elder’s preferred level of defense mP∗ is greater than m(τ):
(14)
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Substituting the youth’s constrained best response function sTAX into (1) allows us to rewrite
the elder’s problem as:
(15) V TAXE = max
m
m
sTAX +m
p− dm = p− τ − dm.
This simply restates the fact that, once the youth’s tax constraint is binding, the elder can receive
no more than p− τ from the plot, since any additional defensive effort will be offset by increased
stealing by the youth. He will therefore not choose m > m(τ). Since his optimal effort below
m(τ) is unchanged, his reaction function becomes:
(16) mTAX = min
{(
c
c+ d
)2
p
c
,
(p− τ)2
pc
}
.
The model predicts then, that the imposition of a head tax on the youth will lead the elder to
limit his defensive effort, knowing that he cannot keep the youth from stealing. Qualitatively, this
will be similar to a common property regime in which θ = τ/p. Reducing monitoring in order to
let the youth steal is, like communal harvesting, another mechanism by which the elder chooses to
self-interestedly cede his property rights.
Poll taxes were introduced in Igboland in 1928, in order to bolster the power of the Warrant
Chiefs through the creation of Native Treasuries (Afigbo, 1966; Gailey, 1970). The heart of dis-
putes over palms was that they were a valuable source of cash income that could be used to pay tax.
Usoro (1974, p. 60) makes a rough estimation4 that 20% of the value of palm oil exported in 1931
4 0.25 adult males per person X 2,563,148 taxable population in the palm oil belt X 7/6 tax per adult male
£10.28 per ton estimated producer price X 118,133 tons exported = 19.9%
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was collected as tax. At the time taxes were introduced, the value of the tax was roughly equiva-
lent to one four-gallon tin of oil, though this physical burden doubled within a year due to falling
prices (Martin, 1988, p. 113-117). Where palm oil was harvested privately, the receipts were put
to uses for which cash was similarly necessary; the defendant in one case told the court that he had
harvested palms to pay his younger brother’s school fees (ANO 167/43). In another suit, one party
had pledged an okpulor ika (private grove) belonging to the ofo-holder on behalf of the onumara
(quarter) in order to pay the collective fine levied after the Women Riot (OVU 461/36).
It was difficult for youth to pay their taxes by means other than palm harvesting. Allen wrote
that palm produce was the only means of obtaining cash with which to pay tax or purchase imports.
There is little indication in either the literature or archival sources how individuals that did not have
access to palm produce or paid employment were able to meet their tax obligations. Afigbo (1966,
p. 551) writes that, when taxation proposals were discussed with the Igbo, district officers were
asked if they would prosecute people who pawned their children to pay the tax. It is clear that men
did pawn themselves to pay tax (Afigbo, 1966, p. 553), and that women sometimes had to use their
savings to pay their husbands’ tax the first year it was collected (Gailey, 1970, p. 98).
Even where there was no conversion from private to communal property, the introduction of
direct taxation increased the incentive for youth without groves of their own to steal. Based on her
own fieldwork, Green (1941, p. 19) argues that “anything tending to increase the need for money
– the introduction of tax, the increasing demand for European clothing, for schooling and so on”
made the definition of rights over trees more important and contentious, by raising the value of
these rights. The defendant in one case admitted that the plaintiff owned the trees from which he
had harvested and accepted his contentions that private groves belonged to the eldest man in the
family and that it was not lawful for any other person to harvest from them. Even still, he had
reaped from these trees because he had no other means of paying the tax (UNC 17/39).
In several court cases the communal controls imposed on palm cutting are stated directly by
witnesses to have been linked to the payment of tax. In one example, a witness stated that the
palms had been reserved for paying tax (UNC 62/35). In another, the plaintiff stated that a rule had
been made four weeks previously that no-one was to cut palm fruits until notice was given. This
would allow the fruits to ripen and yield enough oil for the payment of tax (OVU 418/35).
The difficulty of enforcing regulations made when palms were made communal for tax payment
is a persistent theme of the court records. If regulations were violated too often, the restrictions
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might become ignored (OVO 440/36) or “spoilt” (OVU 66/36). If this occurred, attempts could
be made to renew the restrictions; the occasion could be marked with a symbolic act such as the
sacrifice of a goat (OVU 418/35).
One difficulty not captured by the model is that of hold-out. Lone individuals might resist the
conversion of their groves to common property for the purpose of tax payments. In one case, “the
villagers” had asked all individuals who held palm trees on pledge to leave these to ripen, so that
the amala (village council) could set them aside for general use. The defendant had objected,
stating that he refused to give over his palm fruits so that others could pay their tax. The court
found in his favor (UNC 35/39). Others were less successful. In one suit, the eldest man of his
village had been forced by the young men to join what he called a “tax meeting.” When he hired
two men to cut palm fruits from his trees, he had been fined 10s (MGC 161/36).
These conflicts were a challenge for colonial officials. The British depended on elders in order
to project power at the local level, and so tried to protect their authority. Allowing elders too much
exclusive control of palm groves, however, made it more difficult to collect tax revenue and created
disaffection among youth. Officials, then, also limited elders’ accumulation of property. The aims
of Indirect Rule and the means of funding it pulled the men on the spot in opposite directions.
These contradictions are clearly evident in two cases – UNC 89/38 and OVO 344/36. In the
first case, the plaintiff had ceased to allow the young men to harvest fruit from his trees after he
did not receive his share of the 10% rebate of tax revenues paid by the colonial government as
compensation for assistance in tax-collection. By his own estimation, this would have been 15s.
The defendants were then compelled to borrow money to pay their taxes. When their creditors
troubled them, they gathered oil from the fruits on his land. The plaintiff protested:
I told them that my father never told me that one could take one’s palm trees by
force, and that we use to appear in open square and pass a rule that the owners of
the palm trees should allow young men to cut nuts for tax.
One witness told the court that the British officer had instructed the young men to meet with the
elders in discussing these matters, but had also told the old men to limit themselves to one private
grove only. The court found for the plaintiff, deciding that he should not be forced to surrender his
palms and was free to carry on with his trees as he wished.
In the second case, the elders of Umuakole had initially responded to the poll taxes by arranging
for a time during which young men could cut from private groves. The arrangement had collapsed,
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and palms were being cut in common with no restrictions on the time of harvest. A meeting was
summoned and juju administered that no one should cut except on appointed days. The defendants
in the case had not adhered to this decision and forced their way into the plaintiff’s land. A tax
demand note was then received stating that 24 days remained until payment was due. The first
defendant told the court that a meeting was then held and cutting suspended in anticipation of the
tax payment. The defendants, however, were annoyed that, of the eleven persons in Umuakole
with private palm groves, they believed only three were entitled to them. Further, the plaintiff
and others had, in their view, exceeded what their ancestors had. The court initially found for the
plaintiff, but on review the defendants were cautioned and discharged. The reviewing officer noted
that the elders had very strong views on the case. They had claimed that, if the defendants were not
punished, the young men would get out of control. Nonetheless, he believed it was the usurpation
of private groves that had been at the heart of the trouble.
In both these cases, the youth admitted that the palm groves in question were the property of the
elders, but were not willing to allow rights of ownership to interfere with their ability to pay tax.
Colonial officials were caught in the middle. Contradictions between revenue and the maintenance
of law and order forced local administrators into a balancing act.
5.2. Other cases.
5.2.1. Yoruba. Ownership of (mostly wild) palms in Yoruba-speaking parts of Nigeria was largely
private. The lineage was the unit that owned both land and trees (Ward-Price, 1939). Many writers
emphasize that they belonged to the head of the lineage on whose land they stood (Lloyd, 1953).
Indeed, rights over palm trees on a plot of land marked ownership (Schwab, 1955). Many tenants
who rented land were forbidden from exploiting existing palms or planting new ones (Ward-Price,
1939). Rights over palms might similarly be retained by the owner when land was pawned (Forde,
1951). Grants of uncleared land, by contrast, typically included ownership of the trees (Ward-Price,
1939).
There are several reasons why the Yoruba and Igbo responses diverged. Characteristics of the
resource system and resource units differed. The Igbo responded first to European demand, since
the densest grove of wild trees in Africa is found around Owerri (Lynn, 1997, p. 34). Combined
with the unsuitability of Igboland for cocoa, this made palm oil more central to economic life,
which made resource competition more responsive to trade. The governance system in the Yoruba
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city-states that emerged after the fall of Oyo was dissimilar from the decentralized authority ex-
ercised in Igbo villages. The war chiefs who dominated political life in pre-colonial Yorubaland
also dominated the production of palm oil (Oroge, 1971). Users also differed markedly. Resource
competition in Igboland was intensified by its high population density. Yoruba-speaking provinces
such as Ondo (56 persons per square mile in 1931), Oyo (37), Abeokuta (102), Ijebu (125) and
even Ibadan (208) were less densely settled than the Igbo divisions that practiced communal har-
vesting, such as Aba (214), Owerri (527) and Okigwi (570) Martin (1988, p. 155). While a Yoruba
farmer might farm a few acres annually, an Igbo farmer in Aba would often have access to an acre
or less of land.5 This made palms more subtractable in Igboland.
5.2.2. Urhobo. Within Urhobo territory, the rules governing wild palms were similar to those in
Igboland. Wild palms were communally owned and exploited, and the community would regulate
when palms could be harvested, and how much fruit could be harvested by each individual (Aweto,
2005). Open and closed periods were set by the “gerontocratic” leadership of the village (Otite,
1979). This community ownership of palms differed from the more decentralized ownership of
land by families (Otite, 1979).
Planted palms, by contrast, were harvested individually.6 This allows the resource system and
governance system to held constant. However, both resource units and users differed across planted
and wild palms. Wild palms were too few and too scattered to provide full-time work. An extensive
palm plantation, by contrast, would have lowered the opportunity cost of private monitoring, since
this could be combined with regular labor. Most planters in these areas were chiefs (Bridges,
1938). This lowered the costs of adjusting the institutional regime in response to this change in the
nature of the resource.
Urhobo and related Isoko migrants, both called “Sobos” in colonial sources, were noted for their
palm-harvesting camps in the Edo-speaking and eastern Yoruba-speaking parts of Nigeria (Forde,
1951). These migrants traveled to regions of greater labor scarcity where the local population
neglected palm production (Udo, 1964). The rights they acquired differed from the system in
Urhoboland, and typically took the form of leases. In the Edo-speaking regions, they paid an
initial entrance fee of 12s, with a £1 annual rent for each camp. With time, many assimilated into
their host villages (Usuanlele, 2007). In Ekiti, Yoruba lineage heads leased palm trees to immigrant
5Yoruba: (Forde, 1951). Igbo: National Archives Ibadan, CSO 26 20610, Assessment Report for Aba Division.
6I am grateful to a referee for alerting me to this distinction.
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groups in return for annual payments of cash and oil (Lloyd, 1953). Similar arrangements were
found in Ijebu Waterside, Owo, and Ikale (Forde, 1951). Faced with a Yoruba resource system,
resource units, and governance system, Urhobo users harvested within Yoruba property rights
institutions.
6. IMPLICATIONS
While I look at one society, this study has broader implications for our understanding of com-
mon property, collective action, and the impact of trade on the commons. The basic result is that
common property can limit the costs of competing over natural resources. If this competition
becomes more intense as the value of the resource rises, common property will become more at-
tractive relative to private property, not less. This case will be most relevant to examples where
it is simpler to monitor that resource extraction has occurred, rather than where or how much.
The effort restrictions imposed by imachi nkwu resemble the seasonal closures, limits on entry,
and total allowable catch restrictions that are found in fisheries where users vary by skill (Johnson
and Libecap, 1982). For the Igbo, common property existed because it helped reduce the costs of
defending private property that had intensified as palm oil became commercialized. It provided a
mechanism by which those who did not own trees of their own were still enabled to pay tax.
The court cases give a window into how property rights are managed in poor rural communities.
The collective action needed for the operation of this scheme was facilitated by the relative ease of
detecting violations, by the small size of Igbo communities, and by the fact that it could be enacted
within an existing institutional arrangement. It was hindered by the diffuseness of authority in Igbo
society, by instances where the rules governing harvesting were not clear, and by the additional
complications created by the Native Courts as a competing jurisdiction. Collective action worked
in part by giving the broader community an interest in preserving the communal arrangement.
Here, the essential feature of Igbo society is that defense of property was largely private. The
result, then, is most relevant where state enforcement of private property is weak. This is not true
only of small agrarian communities, but of many situations in developing countries.
The Igbo, like many other societies, were able to successfully manage common property and
pursue collective action in the presence of international trade. This echoes the general findings of
Ostrom (1991). Consistent with Copeland and Taylor (2009) and Baland and Platteau (1998), it
shows that a diversity of responses are possible to commercialization. The Ostrom (2007, 2009)
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framework for analyzing social-ecological systems can be used to identify characteristics of the
resource system, resource units, the governance system and users that will guide these responses.
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APPENDIX A. DATA APPENDIX
My sources of archival evidence fall into three categories:
(1) Native Court Records: A selection of Civil Judgment Books from the Aba-Na-Ohazu
(ANO), Nkwo Udara (NU), Obohia (ONC), and Ugba (UNC) Native Courts were used
based on their availability. The Nkwo Udara series contains judgments from the Mvosi
(MGC), Ovuku (OVU), Ovuoko (OVO), and Ovokwu (OVW) Group Courts. These are the
principal sources for this study.7
(2) CSE: Central Secretary’s Office, Nigeria, 1906-1940. This contains a variety of correspon-
dence, including Intelligence Reports.
(3) Abadist: This series contains documents and correspondence relating to Aba Division,
including Assessment Reports. Land dispute records in these files generally contain fac-
similes of the relevant court proceedings as well as petitions to colonial officials about the
judgments rendered and correspondence between officials concerning these cases. A sam-
ple from this series has been included in the Web Appendix. Specifically, this is Abadist
9/1/268. I was not able to copy a sample native court case from the National Archives in
Enugu, since these are contained in bound volumes, but the transcript of Umuaro Native
Court Civil Suit 283/33 contained in this record is of the same format as the cases in these
books.
The Native Court records that are available date mostly from the 1930s and later. These are rough
transcripts handwritten in English by the court clerk during proceedings. Each record begins by
stating the names and home villages of the plaintiffs and defendants; in cases involving violations
of palm-cutting regulations, it is not uncommon to see more than ten defendants in a single case.
The statement of grievance and any claim for damages are also given. Parties make statements and
call witnesses. Cross-examination by the opposing party and the court is common. Cases are often
adjourned for further witnesses, inspection of the land, or swearing of juju. The court’s decision is
recorded, along with any statement by the president.
7Citations of these cases are abbreviated for legibility. For example, Nkwo Udara civil suit 140 of 1935 is cited as NU
140/35
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APPENDIX B. EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL
B.1. θ as a fixed parameter. Suppose the elder is unable to choose θ, which is instead set by
custom or by technological constraints. In that case, the condition that V CE > V
P
E reduces to:((
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− θ)−
(
c
c+ d
)2)
p > k¯
It will only be possible to satisfy this condition if θ is sufficiently small that the coefficient on p
on the left hand side is positive. If this is the case, then communal property is preferred if the price
of palm oil is sufficiently high. This is similar to the condition given in (11), except that the elder
will never prefer communal property if the share he must surrender is too great.
B.2. Other responses.
B.2.1. Cooperative monitoring. Suppose now that, rather than one elder and one youth, there
are N elders and N youth. I abstract away from negative spillovers that can arise from private
monitoring by allowing each youth to steal from only one particular grove. That is, youth i can
only steal from elder i, youth j can only steal from elder j, and so on. To further simplify the
analysis, I will only consider symmetric equilibria.
Elders may now devote their efforts to either private monitoring, m, or cooperative monitoring
g. The marginal cost of cooperative monitoring is δ. Define G ≡ ∑Ni=1 gi as the total amount of
cooperative monitoring, and G−i ≡ G − gi as total monitoring by all elders apart from elder i. I
dispense with i subscripts below. If youth i devotes s units of effort to stealing from elder i, elder
i devotes m units of effort to private monitoring, and total cooperative monitoring is G, then the
youth is able to successfully steal a fraction s
m+s+G
of the oil, while the elder retains a fraction
m+G
m+s+G
.
Each elder’s problem can be written as:
(17) V PCME = max
m,g
{
m+ g +G−i
g +m+ s+G−i
p− dm− δg
}
,
while each youth’s problem can be written as:
(18) V PCMY = max
s
{
s
g +m+ s+G−i
p− cs
}
.
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Both (17) and (18) are concave, and so they can be maximized from their first-order conditions.
Each elder’s best responses, then, are:
(19) mPCMBR = max
{√
sp
d
− s− g −G−i, 0
}
,
and
(20) gPCMBR = max
{√
sp
δ
− s−m−G−i, 0
}
.
The youth’s best response is:
(21) sPCMBR = max
{√
(m+G)p
c
−m−G, 0
}
.
Comparing (19) and (20), it is apparent that the elder will either monitor privately or coopera-
tively, but not both. He will monitor cooperatively if d > δ, and privately otherwise. If d ≤ δ, then,
this collapses to the baseline private property case.This is the first result of considering cooperative
monitoring. Although it provides social benefits (from the perspective of the elders) that private
monitoring does not, a self-interested elder does not consider these in his decision. Cooperative
monitoring entails a collective action problem, and may be under-provided.
Consider the outcome where d ≤ δ, and cooperative monitoring occurs. In a symmetric equilib-
rium, G−i = (N − 1)g. Substituting this into (20) and (21) and setting m = 0 gives equilibrium
stealing and monitoring:
(22) gPCM∗ =
(
c
c+ δ
)2
p
Nc
,
and
(23) sPCM∗ =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2
p
δ
.
Substituting (22) and (23) into (17) and (18) gives the equilibrium payoffs under private property
with cooperative monitoring:
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(24) V PCME =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
δ
c
)
p,
and
(25) V PCMY =
(
c
c+ δ
)2
p.
Now consider the case of communal property. Assume again that there is a fixed cost k¯. I restrict
analysis to the case where each elder offers the same θ. As with private monitoring, I assume that
cooperative monitoring under communal property has a marginal cost σ > 0 that is lower than
the cost of monitoring under private property (δ). Conditional on θ, each elder’s problem can be
written as:
(26) V CCME = max
m,g
{
m+ g +G−i
g +m+ s+G−i
(1− θ)p− γm− σg − k¯
}
,
while each youth’s problem can be written as:
(27) V CCMY = max
s
{
θp+
s
g +m+ s+G−i
(1− θ)p− cs
}
.
As in the private case, these can be solved from their first order conditions, giving best response
functions:
(28) mCCMBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
γ
− s− g −G−i, 0
}
,
(29) gCCMBR = max
{√
s(1− θ)p
σ
− s−m−G−i, 0
}
,
and:
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(30) sCCMBR = max
{√
(m+G)(1− θ)p
c
−m−G, 0
}
.
As under private property, cooperative monitoring will only occur if it is individually rational,
that is, if γ ≥ σ. Otherwise, this collapses to the case without cooperative monitoring. Following
similar logic to the above, the equilibrium levels of cooperative monitoring and theft in a symmetric
equilibrium with γ ≥ σ are:
(31) gCCM∗ =
(
c
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p
Nc
,
and
(32) sCCM∗ =
(
σ
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p
σ
.
Payoffs conditional on θ are:
(33) V CCMY =
(
σ
c+ σ
)2(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
d
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯.
and
(34) V CCMY = θp+
(
c
c+ σ
)2
(1− θ)p.
If each elder chooses θ subject to the constraint that V CCMY ≥ V PCMY , this gives an optimal θ of
(35) θCCM∗ =
(
δ
c+δ
)2 − ( σ
c+σ
)2
1− ( σ
c+σ
)2 .
Substituting this into (33) and (34) gives equilibrium payoffs:
(36) V CCME =
(
c
c+ δ
)2(
c+ 2δ
c+ 2σ
)(
1−
(
N − 1
N
)
d
c
)
p− k¯,
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and
(37) V CCMY =
(
δ
c+ δ
)2
p.
As in the case without cooperative monitoring, these payoffs ensure that the elder will prefer
common property so long as the price of oil is above a given threshold.
B.2.2. Wage labor. Suppose the elder hires the youth to gather palm oil. He offers a piece-rate
wage of w for each unit of oil delivered. The youth, however, can steal some of this oil for himself.
As before, if the youth exerts effort s in stealing and the elder exerts effortm in monitoring, assum-
ing the same marginal costs as under the standard private property case, the youth will successfully
steal a fraction s
m+s
of the oil, while the elder will receive a share m
m+s
. Thus, the elder’s problem,
conditional on w, can be written as:
(38) V WE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(p− w)− dm
}
,
while the youth’s problem can be written as:
(39) V WY = max
s
{(
1− s
m+ s
)
w +
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
Each player’s best response function can be found from the first order conditions, as above.
These can then be used to solve for equilibrium levels of stealing and monitoring. Conditional on
w, the elder and youth receive payoffs:
(40) V WE =
(
c
c+ d
)2
(p− w),
and
(41) V WY = w +
(
d
c+ d
)2
(p− w).
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Comparing the expression for V WE in (40) to the expression for V
P
E in (4), it is apparent that the
elder can do no better paying a wage than he can under private property. If w = 0, he does just as
well paying a wage, while if w > 0 he does worse.
B.2.3. Paid monitoring. Suppose the elder hires a youth to monitor on his behalf. There will be
no possible efficiency gains unless the youth’s marginal cost of monitoring is less than that of the
elder. Call this e < d. The elder offers a piece-rate wage of w for each unit of oil delivered. I
abstract away from the problem that the hired monitor might steal, and instead focus on the elder’s
problem of providing the paid monitor with incentives to increase his effort.
If the thieving youth exerts effort s in stealing and the hired youth exerts effort m in monitoring,
the thief will successfully steal a fraction s
m+s
of the oil, while the paid monitor will deliver a share
m
m+s
to the elder. In equilibrium, both s and m will depend on w. Thus, the elder’s problem can be
written as:
(42) V PME = max
m,w
{
m(w)
m(w) + s(w)
(p− w)
}
.
The monitor’s problem, conditional on w, can be written as:
(43) V PMM = max
m
{
m
m+ s
w − em
}
,
while the thief’s problem can be written as:
(44) V PMY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs
}
.
Following the same logic used to solve the standard private property case, equilibrium theft and
monitoring will be given by:
(45) mPM∗ =
p
c
(
wc
pe+ wc
)2
,
and
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(46) sPM∗ =
w
e
(
pe
pe+ wc
)2
.
Substituting these into (47), the elder’s problem can be rewritten as:
(47) V PME = max
m
{
wc
wc+ pe
(p− w)
}
.
Solving (47) from its first order conditions gives the elder’s optimal wage:
(48) wPM∗ =
√
e(e+ c)− e
c
p.
Thus, the elder’s payoff is:
(49) V PME =
(
c+ 2e− 2√e(e+ c)
c
)
p.
Because (49) is decreasing in e, the elder will only be able to do better than under private or
common property if the hired youth’s cost of monitoring is sufficiently low.
B.3. Other considerations.
B.3.1. Altruism. Suppose that, in addition to valuing their own payoffs, each player has an altru-
ism parameter α ∈ [0, 1], which he uses to weight the payoff received by the other player. Denoting
payoffs as y, this is is equivalent to stating that VY = yY +αyE , and VE = yE +αyY . Under these
conditions, the elder’s problem with private property can be rewritten as:
(50) V PAE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
p− dm+ α
(
s
m+ s
p− cs
)}
,
while the youth’s payoff is given as
(51) V PAY = max
s
{
s
m+ s
p− cs+ α
(
m
m+ s
p− dm
)}
.
Following similar steps to those given above gives equilibrium stealing and monitoring:
IMACHI NKWU 43
(52) mPA∗ =
(
c
c+ d
)2
(1− α)p
c
,
and
(53) sPA∗ =
(
d
c+ d
)2
(1− α)p
d
.
It is clear from (58) and (59) that both players restrict effort as a result of their altruism. Equi-
librium payoffs under private property become:
(54) V PAE =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
p+ α
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
p,
and
(55) V PAY =
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
p+ α
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
p.
Altruism, then, reduces each player’s effort, increasing both players’ material payoffs, even
ignoring any utility benefits from altruism.
Under communal property, the players’ payoffs can be rewritten to include altruism. For the
elder, taking θ as given, this becomes:
(56) V CAE = max
m
{
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯ + α
(
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs
)}
,
while the youth’s payoff is given as
(57) V CAY = max
s
{
θp+
s
m+ s
(1− θ)p− cs+ α
(
m
m+ s
(1− θ)p− γm− k¯
)}
.
Following the same logic as before gives equilibrium stealing and monitoring:
(58) mCA∗ =
(
c
c+ γ
)2
(1− α)(1− θ)p
c
,
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and
(59) sCA∗ =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2
(1− α)(1− θ)p
γ
.
Payoffs, conditional on θ, become:
(60) V CAE =
(
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯ + α
(
θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
(1− θ)p
)
,
and
(61) V CAY = θp+
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
(1− θ)p+ α
((
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
(1− θ)p− k¯
)
.
If the elder selects θ subject to the constraint that V CAY ≥ V PAY , he will choose:
θCA∗ =
B1 −B2 + α(A1 − A2)
1−B2 − αA2 +
αk¯
p(1−B2 − αA2) ,(62)
where
A1 =
(
c
c+ d
)2(
1 +
αd
c
)
,
A2 =
(
c
c+ γ
)2 (
1 +
αγ
c
)
,
B1 =
(
d
c+ d
)2 (
1 +
αc
d
)
,
B2 =
(
γ
c+ γ
)2(
1 +
αc
γ
)
.
The final payoffs can be obtained by substituting (62) into (60) and (61). Now that the fixed
administrative costs of communal property enter into the youth’s payoff, the elder’s offer of θCA∗ is
contingent on p. In addition, the fact that each player takes the other’s payoffs into account when
evaluating his own utility means that the condition V CAE ≥ V PAE no longer necessarily simplifies
to a cutoff value for p.
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B.3.2. Seniority. Suppose now that the standard game with one elder and one youth is repeated
infinitely. The youth and elder each discount future payoffs by the factor β. The elder remains an
elder indefinitely. Each period, there is a probability pi that the youth can be promoted to the rank
of elder. If that happens, the original elder and the newly made elder continue playing the game
as elders with two newly-created youths. The purpose of this extension to the model is to assess
the effect of a youth’s future prospect of becoming an elder on outcomes under both private and
communal property.
First, consider private property. I discuss one particular “cooperative” outcome, in which coop-
eration is sustained by the threat of a trigger strategy. In particular, the elder retains the the entirety
of his harvest for himself, offering nothing to the youth. The youth’s adherence to private property,
then, is sustained by nothing more than the promise that he will some day have property of his
own.
For simplicity, I assume the elder does not monitor in this scenario. This gives the youth the
opportunity to steal the oil for himself with negligible effort. Even so, the elder may be able to sus-
tain the youth’s cooperation through the threat of reverting to a punishment strategy and revoking
the possibility of promotion to the rank of elder if the youth steals. Because the equilibrium in the
static game is also a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, it is a natural candidate for a punishment
strategy. If this occurs, the youth receives V PY and the elder receives V
P
E forever, and the youth
is never made an elder. Private property with no stealing will be implementable so long as the
youth’s payoff from continuation is greater than his payoff from the optimal one-shot deviation
and its associated continuation payoff.
I denote V PCY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who never deviates, V
PD
Y as the
present value of lifetime utility for a youth who deviates in the current period, V PCE as the present
value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth never deviates, and V PDE as the present value of
lifetime utility for an elder if the youth deviates in the current period. Following the setup above,
these payoffs can be written as:
(63) V PCY = 0 + β
(
(1− pi)V PCY + piV PCE
)
,
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(64) V PDY = p+
β
1− β
(
d
c+ d
)2
p ≡ p+ β
1− βλY p,
(65) V PCE =
p
1− β ,
and
(66) V PDE = 0 +
β
1− β
(
c
c+ d
)2
p ≡ β
1− βλEp.
It is possible to use (65) to re-write (63) as:
(67) V PCY =
βpip
(1− β)(1− β + βpi) .
Thus, the youth will cooperate so long as V PCY ≥ V PDY , which simplifies to:
(68) pi ≥ p¯iP ≡
(
1− β
β
)(
1− β(1− λY )
β(1− λY )
)
.
Thus, if the youth’s prospect of becoming an elder is sufficiently promising, it can sustain his
adherence to private property.
Now, consider a similar scenario under communal harvesting. Here, the elder offers the youth
a share θ of the oil each period, keeping a share (1 − θ) for himself. As before, the elder does
not monitor, giving the youth the opportunity to deviate with negligible effort and appropriate
the remaining share (1 − θ) for himself. Again, the punishment strategy used is reversion to the
static equilibrium under private property, and permanent removal of the possibility that the youth
becomes an elder.
I denote V CCY as the present value of lifetime utility for a youth who never deviates, V
CD
Y as the
present value of lifetime utility for a youth who deviates in the current period, V CCE as the present
value of lifetime utility for an elder if the youth never deviates, and V CDE as the present value of
lifetime utility for an elder if the youth deviates in the current period. Following the setup above,
these payoffs can be written as:
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(69) V CCY = θp+ β
(
(1− pi)V CCY + piV CCE
)
,
(70) V CDY = p+
β
1− βλY p,
(71) V CCE =
(1− θ)p
1− β ,
and
(72) V PDE = 0 +
β
1− βλEp.
It is possible to use (71) to re-write (69) as:
(73) V CCY =
(1− β − βpi)θ + βpi
(1− β)(1− β + βpi)p.
Thus, the youth will cooperate so long as V CCY ≥ V CDY . If 1− β − βpi > 0, this simplifies to:
(74) θ ≥ (1− β + βλY )(1− β + βpi)− βpi
1− β − βpi .
If, however, 1− β − βpi < 0, then the youth always deviates. The condition in (74) becomes a
restriction that θ is less than a negative number, which cannot occur. This will be the case if either
β or pi are sufficiently large that the adverse effect of an increase in θ on the youth’s expected
payoff when he becomes an elder outweighs the benefit while he is a youth.
Comparing V CCE with V
PC
Y , it is clear that the elder will prefer private property so long as
he can induce the youth to cooperate, since his per-period payoff is greater (p versus (1 − θ)p).
The possible advantage of common property here becomes the range of pi over which the youth’s
cooperation can be secured. Define the following cutoff value for pi:
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(75) p¯iC ≡
(
1− β
β
)(
1− β(1− λY )− θ
β(1− λY )− θ
)
.
If the youth is sufficiently patient, i.e. if β > 1
2(1−λY ) , then 1− β(1− λY ) < β(1− λY ). If this
case holds, then p¯iC < p¯iP for any θ > 0. Otherwise, p¯iC > p¯iP for any θ > 0. Under communal
property, it may be possible for the elder to secure the youth’s cooperation, even if pi < p¯iP . If the
youth is sufficiently patient, the elder will be better off gaining this cooperation than under infinite
repetition of the static game. Consider the extreme case, where pi = 0. Then, (74) simplifies to
θ > 1 − β + βλY . If the elder makes this minimal offer of θ to the youth, he will be better off
than with the infinite repetition of the static game so long as (1 − (1 − β + βλY ))p > λEp. This
simplifies to the condition that β > λY
1−λE , i.e. that the youth is sufficiently patient.
